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The Potential Effects of Federal Campaign Finance Reform on Women
Candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate
Abstract
This study investigates the potential effects of campaign finance reform, namely the banning of party or
"soft" money on each candidate group (Democrats and Republicans, men and women) for the U.S. House
of Representatives and Senate. Emphasis is placed on the difference in the effect the reform will have on
the sexes. Following analysis of the sources and average totals of campaign financing for all of the
groups in the 2000 elections, it can be noted that Republican women stand to be affected by campaign
finance reform more than any other group, as they received the largest average amount of party money.
Meanwhile, Democratic women stand to be the least affected by the reform. Republican men are slightly
more likely than Democratic men to be affected by the reform. Therefore, as a whole, the Republican Party
stands to lose the most campaign finance dollars through the reform, with Republican women sustaining
the largest losses.
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The Potential Effects of Federal Campaign Finance Reform
on Women Candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives
and Senate
Cameo Kaisler
Abstract
This study investigates the potential effects of campaign
finance reform, namely the banning of party or "soft" money on
each candidate group (Democrats and Republicans, men and
women) for the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate.
Emphasis is placed on the difference in the effect the reform will
have on the sexes. Following analysis of the sources and average
totals of campaign financing for all of the groups in the 2000 elections, it can be noted that Republican women stand to be affected
by campaign finance reform more than any other group, as they
received the largest average amount of party money. Meanwhile,
Democratic women stand to be the least affected by the reform.
Republican men are slightly more likely than Democratic men to be
affected by the reform. Therefore, as a whole, the Republican Party
stands to lose the most campaign finance dollars through the
reform, with Republican women sustaining the largest losses.
Introduction and Background
Campaign finance reform has been at the forefront of political discussion and debate in the United States Congress for more
than seven years. On March 27, 2002, President George W. Bush
signed a new campaign finance reform bill, commonly known as
McCain-Feingold or Shays-Meehan, into law. The changes laid out
in the bill took effect following the 2002 congressional election, on
Wednesday, November 6, 2002.
With new campaign finance provisions in place, it is necessary to consider the potential effects of campaign finance reform on
U.S. elections. The study of campaign finance reform could go in
several directions, as many aspects of campaign finance law have
been changed. The focus of this study is the potential effects that
the ban on contributions by the political parties could have on the
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success of each candidate group (Democrat and Republican men
and women) in fundraising for their campaigns and winning their
elections, with a particular emphasis on the effect of the new law
on women candidates. Third party candidates were not included in
this study, as they rarely receive significant amounts of money from
their political parties.
In order to determine whether or not campaign finance
reform will affect the four major candidate groups differently, this
study analyzed the campaign finance data provided by the Federal
Election Commission for all year 2000 U.S. House of
Representatives and Senate elections. Fundraising totals were
compiled for every Democratic and Republican candidate: men and
women, incumbents, challengers, and open seat candidates in all
fifty states. The data set consisted of 789 candidates.
In order to understand the implications of the current campaign finance reform law, it is useful to know the major provisions
of the law, and how they are different from previous laws. An
important term in campaign finance reform, and the focus of this
paper, is party contribution (or soft money), which is money donated to candidates or state parties from their political party. By the
late 1980s, unregulated soft money had become a major part of
campaign finance for both Democrats and Republicans, with both
parties spending tens of millions of soft dollars on staff salaries,
overhead, voter turnout programs, and other political efforts
designed to affect the outcome of federal elections (Corrado 2001:
19). The concern over soft money has grown throughout the 1990s.
Soft money donations in 1992 stood at $86 million. In 1996 they
had increased to $260 million, and in 2000, soft money donations
reached over $400 million.
The following chart outlines how much party money was
contributed to Congressional and state elections in the 2000 cycle.
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The U.S. government passed many different forms of campaign finance laws over the past century, but none is as restrictive
as Shays-Meehan. Before the new legislation became law, the
Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) governed all restrictions
on campaign financing. The following chart outlines the changes
instituted by Shays-Meehan.
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The bottom line of campaign finance reform is that it bans
soft money contributions to federal level campaigns. Therefore, the
amount of soft money contributed to federal candidates’ campaigns
in the 2000 elections, and whether or not there is a discrepancy in
the amount of soft money donated to each candidate group, will be
the most important indicator of whether or not campaign finance
reform will affect the genders differently.
Research Question
Considering that both political parties funnel many millions
of dollars to their candidates, it is difficult to decipher an immediate difference in the new legislation’s effects on the two parties. It
stands to reason that both parties have a great deal to lose under this
new law, but is there really a difference? Many political scientists
have predicted that the new laws will affect Democratic candidates
more than Republicans, as Republicans have proven themselves to
be more effective in raising hard dollars (Bibby 2003: 252).
However, Republicans have also consistently out-raised and outspent the Democrats in soft money donations. Thus, both parties
have some catching up to do in order to match the fundraising that
they have been able to pull together in the past.
According to a study conducted by Paul Herrnson and Kelly
Patterson, discrepancies exist in the ways that political parties funnel hard money to different candidate groups. The Democrats distributed 82 percent of their funds to candidates in competitive races
(defined as those races decided by 20 percent or less of the twoparty vote) (Herrnson & Patterson 2002: 112). The Republicans
delivered 91 percent of their funds to GOP candidates in these same
contests. Republican Party spending favored House challengers
(both competitive and noncompetitive), who received roughly 35
percent of all party funds. Incumbents of both parties received less,
reflecting Democratic Party leaders’ desire to capture Republicanheld seats, the GOP’s leaders’ desire to expand their party’s majority, and the beliefs of both parties that control of the House majority would be decided in a handful of contests (ibid).
Diana Dwyre and Robin Kolodny reported similar results in
their study of party spending during the 2000 elections. They point
out that during the 1990s, the political parties took on a more active
role in campaigns. For example, parties now engage in voter identification and mobilization, fund-raising, candidate training, oppo-
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sition research, issue developments, polling, and media advertising.
These activities often put parties at the center of exchanges between
candidates, contributors, and consultants, as well as voters (Dwyre
& Kolodny 2002: 134). They go on to discuss in great detail the
soft and hard expenditures by both political parties during the 2000
election cycle, yet they do not mention gender as a factor once.
Instead they opted, as did Herrnson and Patterson, to concentrate
on race competitiveness, which once again ignores the issue of gender. In fact, no hard numbers have been made available as to the
differences in party spending by gender.
While a great deal has been written about women in federal elections, including women’s campaign financing, very little has
been written about how campaign finance reform, such as ShaysMeehan, will affect women candidates. Despite the lack of literature on the topic, there is concern within the women’s political
community about the potentially hazardous effects of limiting soft
money donations for women candidates.
During the American University course “Women in the
2002 Elections: Another Year of the Woman?” (Government
580.02), representatives from most of the major women’s political
organizations and PACs spoke on the topic of women running for
higher office, particularly federal office and state governorships.
Each of the speakers represented a group or organization that,
among their other goals, promotes women candidates for public
office, and strives to help women win elections. When asked about
their views on how campaign finance reform would affect women
candidates, nearly every representative stated that her organization
was concerned about how the changes brought about by ShaysMeehan would affect not only their organizations’ abilities to be
involved with campaigns, but with the success of women candidates in general.
For example, Erica Henri, Political Director of the Women’s
Campaign Fund (WCF), the oldest non-partisan political action
committee dedicated to electing pro-choice women running for
office at all levels, stated that her organization feels that campaign
finance reform will help incumbents and hurt challengers (Henri
2002). She predicted that women will be negatively affected by
campaign finance reform through unexpected effects that she fully
expects will surface in the wake of a new campaign finance system.
Following each passage of the FECA, unexpected results that war-
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ranted amendments surfaced during the following election. If the
precedent of past FECAs holds true for Shays-Meehan, there will
be unexpected results from new campaign finance reform legislation.
The largest player in the game of women’s PAC fundraising
is EMILY’s List. Formed in 1985, EMILY, an acronym for "Early
Money Is Like Yeast: it makes the dough rise," supports pro-choice,
Democratic women candidates. In 1994 EMILY became the third
highest PAC money raiser, and by 1998, it was the largest PAC contributor in the U.S. (EMILY’s List 2003). Their President and
founder, Ellen Malcolm, agreed completely with Henri about the
future effects of campaign finance reform on women. Malcolm
stated that she feels groups like EMILY are their own form of campaign finance reform. They fundraise through what is commonly
called "bundling." EMILY’s List provides their members (there are
currently over 68,000) with information about the candidates that
they have endorsed, and their members decide to which candidates
they would like to donate money. The members send their checks,
made out to the candidates of their choice, to EMILY, which in turn
"bundles" the checks and sends them to the candidate. Bundling
has been quite successful for EMILY, as they donated $9.3 million
to their endorsed candidates in the 2000 election cycle. Malcolm is
less concerned about campaign finance reform hurting her organization because, through their method of fundraising, all of
EMILY’s money is hard. However, she worries that Shays-Meehan
will affect both women and Democrats considerably (Malcolm
2002). Like Henri, she predicts that there will be huge unintended
consequences of Shays-Meehan on women and national parties.
With women holding just 13 percent of all seats in the U.S.
House and Senate, every dollar counts in helping them to maintain
their seats and in helping new candidates attain victory in future
elections. Republicans may be better hard money fundraisers, but
are they giving an equal portion of hard and soft money to their
male and female candidates? Democrats supposedly have relied
more heavily on soft money donations than Republicans, but do
their women receive more soft money on average than their men?
While Henri and Malcolm expressed concern, they did not
provide any systematic basis for their concern. Why is campaign
finance viewed as a threat to women running for federal office? As
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we will see in the literature review, it has been shown that thanks to
groups like the WCF and EMILY, women fundraise at the same
rates as men. No studies have been conducted to look at men and
women’s fundraising and determine how limitations such as the
ban on soft money are likely to affect their races. This study will
provide an opportunity to predict what the affects of Shays-Meehan
will be on women in the 2004 election. If the results look grim, and
with enough warning, this analysis may be able to help women candidates and their supporters make the necessary changes in their
fundraising strategies and prepare themselves for the new frontier
of campaign financing. If the results do not show a potentially negative effect on women’s candidacies, it will be useful information
to pass along to women candidates and the women’s organizations
and PACs that are concerned about the effects. The relevance of
this study, therefore, lies in its original consideration of gender as a
determinant in party donation.
Literature Review
As women have only recently begun to run for office in
numbers large enough to make good comparisons to male candidates, it is difficult to analyze exactly how campaign finance
reform will affect women candidates. However, how women raise
their funds and whether or not they are as successful as men has
become an important topic to many political scientists.
In her article "Campaign Finance: Women’s Experience in
the Modern Era," Barbara Burrell discusses the commonly held
belief among political scientists and women’s rights activists that
women are less well-represented in U.S. politics because they cannot fund raise as well as men. Burrell points out that campaign
finance and reform are important topics of discussion, as the
amount of money that individuals and groups have to spend on politics influences who gets heard, what issues are debated, how issues
are addressed, and who gets elected (Burrell 1998: 26).
The central point of Burrell’s study is that current women
candidates now raise and spend as much or more than their male
counterparts (Burrell 1998: 27). Statistics have shown that women
achieved near equality with men in the financing of their campaigns in 1982, with the real breakthrough coming in 1988 when
female candidates raised and spent a greater average amount of
money than male candidates. That trend continued in the 1990 and
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1992 elections as well. To Burrell, these statistics conveyed the
message that campaign finance is similar to electoral results: when
women run, they can raise the money they need to win (ibid).
Where is women’s campaign financing coming from?
While women may be raising as much money, or more, than men,
the sources of their campaign financing may be affected in different ways than men’s. Burrell cites FEC statistics that show
women’s funding came primarily from individual donors from
1988 to 1994, with women out-fundraising men in individual contributions (Burrell 1998: 30). Their ability to gain large amounts of
individual contributions is often attributed to women’s success in
attracting individual contributions from other women.
According to a study conducted by Richard Fox, women
candidates rely more heavily on women for support in a campaign,
but when it comes to financial support, women are not in the habit
of making large contributions to political campaigns. This forces
female candidates to work harder to raise sufficient funds (Fox
1997: 115). Fox attributes this to the fact that women have not been
socialized to contribute to political campaigns. All of these factors
lead to women having to spend more time seeking money from a
wide variety of small individual contributors.
Slightly different trends exist in PAC money fund raising.
Democratic women, on average, raise more money than male candidates in comparable races (open seat, challenger, and incumbent),
but Republican women raise less than their male counterparts. A
major factor in causing this trend is the high success rate of certain
women’s PACs, and the different PAC standards for choosing the
candidates that they will endorse.
In 1994 Campaigns & Elections magazine listed 54 state
and national women’s PACs. EMILY’s List is the most successful
of those PACS. To date, EMILY endorsed and helped raise funds
for 55 of the Democratic women who have been elected to the U.S.
House, as well as 11 Senators and 7 governors (EMILY’s List
2003). Those statistics alone help to explain why Democratic
women out represent Republican women in the U.S. House 38 to
21, and 9 to 5 in the Senate (Center for American Women and
Politics 2003). Also contributing to Democratic women having a
fund raising advantage over Republican women is the large percentage of PACs that donate only to pro-choice candidates, regard-
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less of party. Democrats are more likely to hold a pro-choice stance
than Republicans, and are therefore more likely to receive PAC
support from other major contributors such as the Women’s
Campaign Fund, which contributes millions of dollars to prochoice candidates only in every election cycle (Burrell 1998: 36).
Political scientist Rebekah Herrick has expressed concern
about the way in which women and men candidates’ fundraising
abilities are compared. She points out that research on female candidates directs its attention on aggregate comparisons only. Herrick
believes that a more fair comparison comes from contest specific
comparisons (Herrick 1995). Most research on the topic, such as
Burrell’s, compares women's resources and characteristics to men's
resources and characteristics. While this improved the understanding of women's competitiveness, it did not answer the question:
How do women compare to the men against whom they actually
run? Herrick’s examination of women running in open seat races
in 1992 suggests that how the comparison is made affects the findings. She found that women fare less well when compared to their
opponents than when all women are compared to all men candidates. Herrick’s studies also show that, based on data from the
1988 and 1992 elections, women challengers receive less value for
their spending than their male counterparts (Herrick 1996). This
means that women candidates have to spend more money, and
therefore raise more money, in order to receive the same election
results as male candidates.
Richard Logan Fox, in his book, Gender Dynamics in
Congressional Elections, used yet another method of studying
women candidates’ fundraising: concentrating on interviews with
actual candidates’ campaign managers, rather than looking at raw
numbers. Similar to Burrell’s findings, Fox’s study showed that all
female Democratic candidates received the largest portion of their
total campaign receipts from individual contributors – which
totaled a larger portion than that of their male counterparts (Fox
1997: 112). On the other hand, a major complaint of the campaign
managers was that women candidates do not have the same access
to traditional fund-raising networks as men (ibid). One campaign
manager explained that women do not usually have the ties with the
business community that men have and usually have shorter lists of
contacts to call for contributions. Another campaign manager
recounted a negative experience with resistance from the labor
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unions in supporting a woman candidate. The manager felt, based
on that experience, that union leadership is still a male enclave (Fox
1997: 114).
Another large barrier for women in raising funds is the lack
of support from the candidate’s national party. In one case reported by a woman candidate’s campaign manager, the national party
headquarters refused to believe that the candidate was viable and
refused funding. Instead, they funded a male candidate for the
same seat, despite polls favoring the woman candidate by a large
margin. The director of finance for the party stated that this was the
"old-boy" network in action and that they gave the male candidate
party money because he has contacts in the leadership that the
woman candidate did not have (ibid). Overall, 6 of the 25 campaign managers interviewed believed that their candidate was in
some way unable to access the traditional fund-raising networks.
Although this is not an overwhelming proportion (24%), Fox points
out that it represents a significant number of female candidates continuing to struggle with campaign finance.
All of this raises some interesting points about the potential
effects of campaign finance reform. Burrell’s study revealed that in
each election from 1980 to 1990, Republicans contributed a larger
average amount to their female candidates than to their male candidates in U.S. House campaigns (Burrell 1998: 34). Democratic
female nominees were also more successful in acquiring direct contributions and coordinated expenditures from their party during that
period of election cycles. This trend began to level off in the 1990s,
but in many cases, women candidates were still favored for party
funding in the 1992 and 1994 elections (Burrell 1998: 35).
However, very little research has been done on candidate gender
and soft money contributions. Under the new campaign finance
legislation, political parties are no longer able to donate to candidates. If Burrell’s study is correct, that change will have a larger
effect on the total fundraising of women candidates than men.
Research Design and Methodology
Based on all the information presented thus far, the expected outcome of this study is that Republican women will be the candidate group most affected by campaign finance reform, as they are
the least adept at fundraising and receive a large amount of party
money. On the other end of the spectrum, Democratic women are
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expected to be the least affected candidate group, as they are the
best fundraisers and receive the least amount of party money.
In order to determine whether or not these predictions are
correct, the campaign finance data for all general election 2000
U.S. House and Senate candidates were collected from the Federal
Election Commission website (http://www.fec.gov/). A database
was created that included the following information for all general
election candidates: party and sex (both separate and combined to
make four candidate group categories), total amount of money
received, total amount of party contributions to campaign, percentage of total receipts from party contributions, total amount of
money received minus party contributions, win/loss, and win/loss
margin. The data were then compared to determine patterns and
differences between the candidate groups.
In order to provide a complete analysis of the role of party
contributions in election success, a number of different tests were
run. The first test run was a comparison means across candidate
groups for the campaign finance success of each candidate group.
This test would reveal whether or not noticeable differences existed in the average amount of total campaign finance receipts, total
party contribution receipts, and percentage of total receipts from
party contributions between the candidate groups. Next, independent samples T-tests were run in order to determine if any statistically significant difference existed between the means for each candidate group’s campaign finance data. Third, ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression models were made to determine the overall effect
of the independent variables (win/loss and each of the candidate
groups) on a continuous dependent variable (party contribution and
percent total receipts from party contribution). If statistically significant relationships are shown through OLS regressions, it will
support the relationship between the independent and dependent
variables, which would support the hypothesis.
To take a closer look at the role party contributions play in
candidate success, independent samples T-tests were also run comparing the election success (win/loss) of candidates who received
varying amounts of party contribution money. This is important in
determining whether or not party money plays any role in election
success, implying that the loss of party money would affect candidates in future elections. Also, to determine whether or not there is
a correlation between the total amount of money raised by a candi-
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date and the amount of money donated to a candidate by his or her
political party, bivariate correlations were run to compare the correlation by the competitiveness of the race. This test will help to
determine whether or not party contributions affect candidates’
overall fundraising.

Data and Analysis
The table below shows the raw fundraising means for each
candidate group.
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It can be noted that Republican women are, on average, the
least successful fundraisers and receive the largest amount of party
contributions. The percentage of total receipts from party contributions is also the highest for Republican women, which means
that, on average, Republican women stand to lose the highest percentage of their total fundraising amounts under campaign finance
reform. Democratic women are at the opposite end of the spectrum, as they are the most successful fundraisers and receive the
least amount of party contributions of the candidate groups.
Republican and Democrat men stand to lose similar amounts of
total fundraising without party contributions. These raw numbers
support the hypothesis, but are they statistically significant? The
following independent samples T-tests answer that question.
A statistically significant relationship does in fact exist
between Democratic women and Democratic men, and between
Democratic women and Republican men. These relationships are
not surprising, as a large gap exists in the average difference
between the amount of party contribution money received by those
groups. However, a statistically significant difference was not
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shown between Republican women and any other group. This is
surprising, considering that the differences between Republican
women and all other candidate groups were the largest. The most
likely explanation for this lack of statistically significant relationship is small sample size. Unfortunately, despite combining House
and Senate results in order to increase the number of women in the
sample size, the total number of Republican women was just 41.
This small sample size makes it difficult to show statistical significance in any type of test. This problem surfaces in other tests as
well.
To shift the focus from candidate group to the impact of
party contribution on electoral success, independent samples Ttests were run to compare win/loss by party contributions received.

These results reveal an inconsistent pattern in the relationship between party contribution and election success. When comparing candidates who received no party contribution dollars (20
percent of candidates), to all candidates who received some/any
party contribution (80 percent of candidates), a statistically significant relationship did exist. The relationship produced a positive
significance, which means that candidates who received party contributions were more likely to win than candidates who received no
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party contribution. When comparing candidates who received less
than $1000 in party contribution money (40 percent of candidates)
to candidates who received more than $1000 in party contributions,
a statistically significant relationship was shown with a confidence
interval of 94 percent, just one percent short of the traditionally
accepted confidence interval of 95 percent. Upon further investigation with a one-tailed independent samples T-test (rather than the
two-tailed tests run for the rest of this study), a statistically significant relationship was found. This implies that there probably is a
statistically significant tendency for candidates who received more
than $1000 to have better election success than candidates who
received less than $1000. The next party contribution amount
break that was used was $1800, as that represented the fifty-fifty
split between candidates based on party contribution. Here we
again see a statistically significant relationship favoring candidates
who received larger amounts of party money in election success.
Finally, candidates who received large sums of party contribution money, over $10,000 (25 percent of candidates), were compared with candidates who received less than $10,000 (75 percent
of candidates). No statistically significant relationship was shown
here. This is most likely because candidates who received very
large sums of party money tended to be in more competitive races,
where their chances of winning are lower than candidates in less
competitive races. Small sample size is not likely to be the cause
for a lack of statistical significance for the relationship between
win/loss and receiving over $10,000 in party contributions, as 199
of the 789 cases were in this category. Thus, no relationship
between election success and receiving large amounts of party
money could be shown. What we can understand from this model
is that, up to $10,000, party contribution receipts help to predict
win/loss.
A number of bivariate correlations were run to determine if
any relationship exists between the total amount of money raised
by candidates and the amount of party money received by candidates. These correlations were run comparing all candidates, and
also by the competitiveness of the race. At no level of race competitiveness, nor when comparing all candidates, could a statistically significant correlation be shown between these two factors.
There are a number of explanations for this lack of correlation. It is generally accepted by political scientists and has been

38

Campaign Finance

documented for many years that incumbents almost always
fundraise more successfully than any other candidate group, for a
number of reasons (Jacobson, 2001: 89). However, even though
incumbents tend to have high amounts of total campaign finance
receipts, they may not receive large amounts of money from their
parties, as incumbents also tend to be in noncompetitive races.
Herrnson and Patterson (2001) discussed this pattern in their previously mentioned work. Thus, no correlation would exist between
total receipts and party contributions for incumbents, who make up
more than half of all candidates, as many incumbents run unopposed. Also, we have already documented that Republican women
are the least successful fundraisers, but received the most amount
of party money of the candidate groups. It could be argued, based
on the example of Republican women, that candidates who
received the lowest amount of total receipts will receive the most
party money. This relationship is not supported by any of the tests
either. Thus, no correlation can be shown between total campaign
fundraising receipts and party contributions. This implies that parties do not systematically favor candidates based on their fundraising success, nor does fundraising success determine party contributions.
To consider the impact of the loss of party contributions on
election success another way, please refer to charts 1 and 2 in the
appendix. These charts show, in raw number format, the impact of
campaign finance reform to candidates that won and lost in the
2000 elections, divided by candidate group. Here it can be seen
that Republican women who won their races are the most vulnerable to the loss of party contributions, as their total receipts would
decrease the most with that loss. Once again Democratic women
are at the opposite end of the spectrum from Republican women,
and Republican men and Democratic men are somewhere inbetween. The same patterns can be seen when comparing candidates who lost their races.
Finally, in order to pull all of the tests together and form a
model which represents the relationships between all of the independent and dependent variables studied, two ordinary least
squares (OLS) regression models were created. These models
explain the impact of the independent variables, win/loss and each
individual candidate group, on the dependent variable, the amount
of party contribution dollars in Table 5, and the amount of total
receipts from party contribution dollars in Table 6.
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This model does not show a statistically significant difference between win/loss and party contribution. However, it does
show a statistically significant relationship between Republican
women and the total amount of party contribution in dollars. The
relationship is significant with a 99 percent confidence interval.
Democratic women are not included in the regression model data
because they served as the base group in the model. A trend is
apparent in the model, as Republican women have the highest standardized beta (or beta weight) value; Republican men are next, followed by Democratic men. The standardized beta value explains
how much affect an individual variable has on the model as a
whole, with relation to the other independent variables. The trend
tells us that Democratic women would have the smallest affect on
this model, as they received the least party money of any candidate
group. This supports the hypothesis and the predicted results of the
independent samples T-tests, which could not be shown due to
small sample size.
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However, it should be noted that the adjusted R square
(p≤.05) in this model is .008, or 0.8 percent. This means that this
model is explaining less than one percent of the total variance in the
dependent variable. Thus, while this model supports the hypothesis, it is a weak indictor of the overall relationship between the candidate groups and party contribution.
The following table represents the same data as chart 5, but
this time the dependent variable is the percent of total receipts from
party contribution instead of party contribution in dollars.

Here we see a strong correlation between the percent of
total receipts from party contributions and win/loss, but not with
candidate groups. Again, the significance is shown at a 99 percent
confidence interval. Because we see an inverse relationship with
win/loss, the model is explaining that the higher the percentage of
total receipts from party money a candidate relied on, the more
likely the candidate was to lose. As we know, Republican women
rely on party money the most and they were also the most likely
candidates to lose their elections, so this relationship makes sense.
It is difficult to say exactly what this will mean under campaign
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finance reform, but considering that it supports that Democratic
women win the most often of candidate groups, and Republican
women win the least often, we can probably assume that those
problems will only worsen when Republican women suffer the loss
of party contributions and Democratic women remain relatively
unaffected. Also, note the difference in standardized beta values –
they decrease from Republican women through the other candidate
groups, which implies that even though a statistically significant
relationship does not exist between the candidate groups and percent of total receipts from party contributions, the same type of
relationships still exist between the independent and dependent
variables. Once again we see a low adjusted R square, .055. While
this is an improvement from the first regression model, it still fails
to provide strong support for the relevance of the model, as it
explains just 5.5 percent of the variance between variables. For
both regression models, small sample size may be to blame.
Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research
Overall, these statistical evaluations indicate that the
hypothesis was correct – Republican women do stand to lose the
most under campaign finance reform, while Democratic women
stand to be the least effected candidate group. While none of the
evidence to support this hypothesis is overwhelming, with future
research a better case could be made in its support. The number
one problem with this study is sample size. It is extremely difficult
to show statistically significant relationships when using just 41
candidates to represent an entire candidate group. Therefore, these
are humble findings, and further research is necessary in order to
determine any true relationships between election success and party
contributions.
However, there is merit in looking at raw numbers when
small sample size is the problem. Clearly, Republican women do
not fundraise as well as the other candidate groups. While no
strong regression model that explains a great deal about the relationship between party contributions, candidate type, and win/loss
can be shown following this study, the high correlations are encouraging, and with a larger sample size more may be explained about
the relationships between these variables.
The number one suggestion for future research is to add
more candidates. If sample size remains a problem once addition
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al cases have been added, a random sample of candidates with an
over-sample of women may be drawn in order to determine differences between candidate groups. It is important to note that so long
as women represent only a small portion of candidates and elected
officials, studies such as these will be incredibly difficult to complete.
Other ways to improve this study would be to look more
closely at the relationship of vote margin (race competitiveness)
and party contributions along gender lines. It would be useful to
compare the candidate groups in races of different levels of competitiveness, as well as comparing incumbents, challengers, and
open seats. Again, a larger sample size will aid in this process.
Drawing smaller case studies and performing more in-depth
research on individual races could also prove useful in drawing
conclusions about the role of party money in win/loss and competitiveness. Considering the differences in individual and PAC contributions would also help in drawing conclusions about the fate of
each candidate group, as their strength in those areas is likely to
help make up for a loss in party contribution.
One important factor to consider as well is the possibility
that Shays-Meehan / McCain-Feingold may be ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. In Buckley v. Valeo, a 1976 case that
set the precedent for campaign finance, the Court ruled that limiting a candidate’s spending is a violation of the First Amendment of
the Constitution – the right to free speech. It has been predicted by
many political scientists and journalists that the constitutionality of
the new campaign finance legislation will be challenged on these
grounds as well. Arguments in the first legal challenge to the campaign finance law began on December 5, 2002. However, despite
these potential threats to campaign finance reform, it is likely to
persevere in some form. Despite Buckley, the U.S. Congress has
continued to fight for new types of campaign finance reform, particularly the recent movement towards a ban on soft money. Even
if the limitations on issue advocacy advertisements were to be overturned by the Supreme Court, the general ban on party money is
likely to remain. The general public feels that the reform is important, and the bill was very popular among voters. A number of candidates have even run campaigns on campaign finance reform support.
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Even if the ban on party money were overturned, this study
will remain relevant for other reasons. It provides a different look
at campaign financing from those taken by most political scientists,
as it considers how well political parties have been supporting their
female candidates with relation to their support of male candidates.
This study also considers the importance of monetary support from
political parties in being able to fundraise from other sources, and
in election success. It also looks at fundraising as a function of
win/loss, rather than just in raw dollars raised. If the evidence supported in the literature review is correct, then the fact that women
fundraise as well as men is not enough to predict their ability to
win. The important question is whether or not the amount of
money that women are fundraising is enough to help them be competitive and win their races. This study tells us that Democratic
women are raising enough money to be competitive in their races,
but Republican women are still struggling. The database created
for this study will remain extremely useful for a number of analyses besides the potential effects of the ban on party contributions,
and is likely to serve as a tool to study other aspects of U.S.
Congressional elections.
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